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LEGAL WINNERS AND LOSERS
IN THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
SHAUN P. MARTIN

I.

INTRODUCTION

Trillions of dollars were lost when the mortgage and housing
bubble burst in the late 2000s. Some of those losses fell squarely on lenders
who otherwise had made good loans. But billions of dollars were also lost
as a result of mortgage fraud, often the result of borrowers who allegedly
made material misstatements on their loan applications. Not surprisingly,
after the meltdown, banks and others sought to recoup those losses through
civil and ancillary criminal proceedings against these borrowers. Courts
have generally been sympathetic to such efforts. Borrowers adjudged guilty
of mortgage fraud are often ordered to pay millions of dollars in criminal
restitution payments to the banks to which they submitted fraudulent
mortgage applications.
However, these restitution orders are not only typically
unwarranted, but reward active participants in fraudulent conduct who have
already handsomely profited from the underlying fraud. Given the presence
of widespread mortgage securitization during the relevant period, lenders
rarely lost money from even blatantly fraudulent mortgages. Instead, these
lenders originated the underlying mortgages and promptly sold them to
other market participants. Some downstream purchasers lost money when
the housing market collapsed and the fraudulent mortgages went unpaid;
but the restitution orders entered by courts invariably fail to direct
restitution payments to the actual losers. Instead, such orders improperly
award restitution to lenders who made – rather than lost – money from the
fraud.
This Article explores the pervasive securitization of mortgages
during the relevant period and argues that in light of this practice, courts
should not award civil or criminal restitution absent evidentiary proof of
direct losses by the actual lender itself. In the overwhelming majority of
cases, no such evidence exists.
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DIRECT MORTGAGE LENDING: HISTORY AND
INCENTIVES

The traditional view of the mortgage industry is a simple one. It is
also one that resonates with the lay public, since it accurately characterizes
a portion of the way in which banks make some of their loans.
In this model, banks make loans to borrowers and then retain these
loans (and the repayment thereof) as a means of making money.1 There
may be intermediaries in such settings; for example, a particular company
that “services” the loan by performing the day-to-day function of
communicating with the borrower and making sure payments are made on
time and to the correct entity. However, in the end the lender is the entity
that makes the loan, and the borrower’s repayments of that loan are given
to the lender.
When the bank is a direct lender, as the mortgage originator, it
traditionally has substantial incentives to be diligent in the information it
obtains, verifies, and relies upon in deciding which mortgages it funds.2
Those incentives exist because the bank, as a direct lender, incurs the losses
resulting from any fraud.3 In the traditional mortgage transaction, a bank
obtains capital from depositors (e.g., its customers), directly lends funds to
residential borrowers, is the beneficial holder of the resulting mortgages on
the properties, and profits when these mortgages are repaid (or loses money

——————————————————————————————
1
See generally Janet Berry-Johnson, How Does a Mortgage Work?,
LENDINGTREE (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.lendingtree.com/home/mortg
age/how-does-a-mortgage-work/.
2
See generally FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts, FDIC (April 20,
2014), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-5150.html.
3
See generally Ben Hallman, Bank of America Mortgage Fraud: Feds
Sue For Over $1 Billion Alleging Multi-Year Scheme, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/24/bank-ofamerica-mortgage fraud_n_2009791.html.
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if the borrowers default).4 This traditional structure generally gave banks
substantial reason to ask relevant inquiries of potential borrowers and to
confirm the truth of those answers, as the financial consequences of an
unpaid mortgage would fall directly on the bank.5
It nonetheless bears mention that a lender’s economic self-interest
in diligently seeking and verifying relevant information was somewhat
diminished even in this traditional mortgage setting during periods in
which home prices consistently increased.6 Traditional incentives waned
because lenders typically expected to make money even on those loans that
were obtained based on applications that contained factual misstatements.
The factual misstatements did not negatively impact the lenders, due in part
to the appreciation in the value of the home during the period between the
issuance of the mortgage and the subsequent sale (and/or repossession) of
the property.7 For example, if a home buyer overstated his income on a
mortgage application in order to qualify for the purchase of a $300,000
property in 2005 and was subsequently unable to make his required
mortgage payments in 2006, the direct lender would still profit on this loan
because the home, when repossessed or refinanced in 2006, was worth
$350,000 as a result of appreciation in the overall housing market. A
lender in such an economic environment would not suffer adverse
consequences as a result of the misstatements in the application since the
resulting increased equity in the home would be sufficient to repay the
mortgage. In fact, direct lenders often made substantial additional profits in

——————————————————————————————
4
See Navid Vazire, Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the
Subprime Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV.
41, 47 (2009).
5
Id.
6
Jann Swanson, Market Shifts May Lead to More Mortgage
Fraud, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Mar. 1, 2017), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.
com/03012017_mortgage_fraud.asp.
7
See generally Annika Mengisen, Straight From the Foreclosure
Expert's Mouth, FREAKONOMICS (May 1, 2009, 10:09 AM), http://freakono
mics.com/2009/05/01/power-question/.
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such settings as a result of late fees and other charges associated with the
failure to pay and/or refinancing of the mortgage.8
In short, during an era in which home prices were appreciating or
expected to appreciate, all lenders in the mortgage industry – even those
who retained their own loans – profited from loans that were funded based
on radically inaccurate loan application statements.9 This expectation of
profit dramatically affected the standards applied by those lenders in
deciding which statements in a loan application were material. When
lenders expected that housing prices would appreciate, the specific
information in any particular loan application would not solely affect their
rationale for lending. Rather, their decisions were based on market
conditions. It was that anticipated appreciation – not anything in the loan
application itself, nor information about the borrower – that swayed lenders
throughout the industry in deciding whether to fund any particular
mortgage.10
The first half-decade of the twenty-first century was an
appreciating market.11 From 2000 to 2006 home prices rose dramatically
and consistently before leveling out and abruptly declining in 2008.12 Even
when expressed in nominal terms – and, to be clear, lenders in this industry
cared only about actual values, not inflation-adjusted values – even
subprime lenders during this period saw ever-increasing home prices as a
substantial bulwark against losses from even fraudulently obtained
——————————————————————————————
8
Jane Quinn, Foreclosure Fraud: How You Can Be Driven to Default
Even If You Pay On Time, CBS NEWS MONEYWATCH (Oct. 13, 2010, 2:06
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/foreclosure-fraud-how-you-can-bedriven-to-default-even-if-you-pay-on-time/.
9
Id.
10
See generally Ronald Utt, The Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse:
A Primer on the Causes and Possible Solutions, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION (Apr. 22, 2008), http://www.heritage.org/report/the-subprime
-mortgage-market-collapse-primer-the-causes-and-possible-solutions.
11
See Raymond Lombra, The Rise and Fall of the U.S. Housing
Market Past, Present, and Future, J UNIOR ACHIEVEMENT , 3,https://ww
w.juniorachievement.org/documents/20009/36541/Housing-Market-paper.p
df/63e03a3a-9561-4532-be0a-4311141ddb67.
12
Id.
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mortgages.13 The dominant market appreciation, as well as the subsequent
crash in housing prices, is evident from the following chart:

This price appreciation was even more pronounced (and
anticipated) in particular mortgage markets.14 For example, between the
fourth quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2004, the median sales
price for a home in the Sacramento, California area increased a whopping
31.5%, and several other metropolitan areas saw even larger year-on-year
appreciation.15 Traditional mortgage loans made and held by direct lenders
created a facial incentive to avoid (or at least not actively participate) in

——————————————————————————————
13
See William N. Goetzmann, Liang Peng & Jacqueline Yen, The
Subprime Crisis and House Price Appreciation, 44 J. REAL EST. & FIN.
ECON. 33, 57, 60 (2012).
14
See PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA
ECONOMY: CRISIS IN THE HOUSING MARKET (2008), http://www.ppic.org/content/p
ubs/jtf/JTF_HousingMarketJTF.pdf.
15
See Sara Max, Hot Housing Markets, CNN MONEY (Feb. 15 2005 11:40 AM
EST), http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/15/real_estate/metromarkets/.
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mortgage fraud, but even those incentives were generally overwhelmed by
anticipated market appreciation.16
III.

THE RISE OF SECURITIZATION

Direct residential lending was the dominant norm for most of our
nation’s history, with individual banks directly making loans to individual
borrowers and the banks themselves holding the resulting mortgages for
repayment.17 The United States experimented with two brief departures
from this precedent before the 1980s with both episodes ending badly.18
In the late 1800s, due to insufficient capital in local rural banks and
a desire to geographically diversify, farm mortgages were sometimes
financed through a process called “mortgage brokerage,” in which western
borrowers were connected with northeastern and European investors
through mortgage brokers in rural areas.19 The investors who purchased
these farm mortgages reviewed and could accept or reject each individual
loan. As a result, there was substantial (albeit imperfect) quality control.20
Ultimately, the rural mortgage brokerage industry collapsed after many of
the western mortgage companies were devastated by financial crises in the
1890s, and traditional mortgage lending returned to the rural west.21
Quasi-securitization of private mortgages briefly returned in the
1910s and 1920s, this time in cities. Here, northeastern title insurance
——————————————————————————————
16
See Neil Fligstein & Alexander Roehrkasse, Dep’t. Soc. U.C. Berkeley, All
the Incentives Were Wrong: Opportunism and the Financial Crisis at 18, Address
at Yale Law School: Law and Ethics Conference (Feb. 15-16, 2013).
17
See generally Michele Lerner, The mortgage market is now
dominated by non-bank lenders, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 23,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/the-mortgage-market-is
-now-dominated-by-nonbank-lenders/2017/02/22/9c6bf5fc-d1f5-11e6-a783
-cd3fa950f2fd_story.html?utm_term=.afe87c5136a8.
18
See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage
Securitization, 88 IND. L. J. 213, 217 (2013).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 218.
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companies insured private mortgages, pooled them into trusts, and sold
investors “participation certificates” backed by these insured mortgage
pools.22 The inadequate capitalization of the insurance companies,
combined with endemic fraud, engendered the collapse of this fledgling
market as well.23
As a result, direct bank lending again became the unchallenged
norm. This was especially the case once the federal government began
insuring mortgages through programs sponsored by the Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”) (established in 1934), the Department of Veterans
Affairs (“VA”) (established in 1944), and the Farmers Home
Administration (“FmHA”) (established in 1946). This custom was further
normalized once the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie
Mae”) began buying mortgages in 1938.24
In the 1980s, however, large-scale private mortgage securitization
reemerged; this time becoming the overwhelmingly dominant means
through which banks allocated default risks.25 Significantly, and relatedly,
this allocation of default risk radically altered which statements in a
mortgage application would be material to lenders in that industry; i.e.,
which statements the lenders would actually (or even tend to) rely upon in
deciding whether to fund any particular mortgage.26

——————————————————————————————
22
See generally Housing Finance Reform: Should There Be a
Government Guarantee? Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 54-55 (2011).
23
Id.
24
See Michael Simkovic, Competition and Crisis in Mortgage
Securitization, 88 Ind. L.J. 213 (2013).
25
Id. at 24; see also Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The
Transformation of Mortgage Finance and the Industrial Roots of t he
Mortgage Meltdown, UC BERKELEY WORKING PAPER SERIES (Oct.
2012), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2zx8r7fb.
26
See Elena Carletti, Competition and Regulation in Banking, in HANDBOOK OF
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND BANKING 441, 450–51 (Anjan V. Thakor &
Arnoud W. A. Boot eds., 2008) (noting that an increase in the number of competitors
undermines bank screening tests for borrower creditworthiness).
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In its most basic form, mortgage securitization involves selling a
bundle of loans, or specific pieces of that bundle to outside investors.27
When mortgages are securitized, the bank that originated the mortgage no
longer loses money if the homeowner defaults on the mortgage. Instead,
only the outside investors (or some of them) bear the burden of this
default.28 In contrast, the bank that initially funded the mortgage has
already sold its interest in the loan at a profit, and is not injured by the
subsequent default.
The process of mortgage securitization involves four steps.29 First,
an institution – typically a bank – “originates” a loan by making a mortgage
to an individual homeowner.30 Second, either the originating institution or a
different entity “services” the mortgage by collecting and recording
payments made by the borrower.31 Third, another financial entity creates a
“securitization” package by buying large numbers of individual loans from
originators and then packages these loans into products that can be sold to
outside investors.32 Finally, individual investors and institutions (e.g.,
money market mutual funds and pension funds) purchase these securitized
loans – generally called “mortgage backed securities” (“MBS”) – from
securitizers and stand to gain or lose money depending on whether specific
portions of the securitized loans are eventually repaid by the borrowers.33
Starting in the 1980s, but particularly in the 1990s and thereafter,
participants in the mortgage origination industry began to recognize that
they could exponentially increase their profits were they to securitize the
——————————————————————————————
27
See Simkovic, supra note 24, at 214.
28
See generally Edward L. Glaeser, Debating the Securitization of
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010, https://economix.blogs.nytimes.co
m/2010/07/27/debating-the-securitization-of-mortgages.
29
See generally The Department of the Treasury Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure (March 2008) https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
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mortgages they made rather than holding them.34 Three attributes of the
securitization process facilitated the availability of these increased
revenues.
First, originators discovered that outside investors would pay more
for privately originated loans than the expected value of those loans to the
originator. Sometimes outside investors had lower costs of capital, or lesser
regulatory burdens than the originating banks.35 Other times outside
investors could diversify better than a regional (or even national) bank.36
Outside investors were also often willing to pay more for a package of
loans than what that package was objectively (at least to the originator)
worth.37 With outside investors willing to pay more for mortgages than
banks thought they were worth, banks quickly discovered that there was
money to be made by securitizing these loans.38
Second, originating banks and more sophisticated financial
institutions (e.g., brokers) quickly discovered that the profits from
securitization could be multiplied even further by dividing the mortgage
backed securities into “tranches” – by splitting up these bundled mortgages
into various pieces – and selling each of these pieces separately.39 For
example, a bundle of mortgages might be split into ten different tranches,
each representing the right to specific payments on the underlying set of
mortgage loans.40 Accordingly, the first (highest-quality) tranche of the
MBS might represent the right by the investor to be paid the first ten
——————————————————————————————
34
Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, in PAPER
3 FIXING FINANCE SERIES, BROOKINGS 1, 27 (2008).
35
Navid Vazier, Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the
Subprime Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV.
41, 45-46. (2009).
36
Id at 46.
37
See Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, THE
NEW YORK TIMES at A4 (Aug, 26 2007) (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/
business/yourmoney/26country.html).
38
Id.
39
See generally, FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, The Financial Crisis
Inquiry Report, The CDO Machine (Jan. 2011), http://fcic-static.law.stanfo
rd.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
40
Id. at 128.
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percent of payments received by the mortgage pool. For a MBS
representing $100 million in bundled mortgages, an investor who
purchased the first tranche of the MBS would obtain the right to the first
$10 million in payments received from borrowers. This tranche would be
considered an extremely “high quality” tranche because the only way the
investor would lose money would be if over ninety percent of borrowers –
an unprecedented number – defaulted on their mortgages; otherwise, the
first-tranche investor would be paid in full. Similarly, the second tranche of
the MBS might represent the right to be paid the next ten percent of
payments received by the pool. This too would be a high-quality tranche,
since the investor would make money so long as twenty percent of
borrowers repaid or refinanced their loans.
Because these high-quality tranches had very little risk, they were
sold by the originator at a lower premium but could still be sold at a
profit.41 Moreover, because of the low default risk, rating agencies typically
rated these high-quality tranches as AAA investments, and outside
investors would rely on these ratings as a signal that the underlying
investment was essentially risk-free; an attribute for which investors were
willing to pay a premium.42 Subsequent lower-quality tranches of the MBS
(often called “mezzanine” tranches) would involve higher risks but would
simultaneously offer higher returns.43 These too could be sold by the
originating bank and the securitizer at a profit, often obtaining an AA (or
A) rating by the rating agencies despite the heightened risk of default.44
The lowest tranche of the MBS – e.g., the right to receive only the
final ten percent of payments on the mortgages – would necessarily involve
the highest default risk for the outside investor since a default by any
borrower would directly impact returns for this MBS tranche. This lowest
tranche – often called the “equity,” “residual,” or “first-loss” tranche –

——————————————————————————————
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
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would normally be rated the lowest by the rating agencies and would offer
the highest return as compensation for this increased risk.45
Banks and other financial institutions quickly discovered that they
could successfully “bundle” and sell MBS tranches just as they
successfully done so with residential mortgages.46 Moreover, these same
institutions also discovered that by doing so, they could enhance their
profits as well as distort public perception of risk. Institutions accordingly
began selling collateralized debt obligations (“CDO”) that consisted of
low-quality tranches from a variety of different mortgage-backed securities
that the broker would originate and offload to investors.47 These CDO
consisted of the riskiest portions of multiple mortgage-backed securities
and accordingly entailed a substantial risk of default.48
Participants in the mortgage industry also discovered that they
were able to hide these default risks, as well as further enhance their
profits, by tranching CDO in the same way they had tranched the
underlying MBS. For example, the first tranche of a CDO might
correspond to the first ten percent of payments on the CDO, the second
tranche the next ten percent, and so on. Financial institutions and brokers in
the mortgage industry would then sell these CDO tranches to investors, just
as they sold MBS tranches.49
Because CDO almost exclusively consisted of the lowest-quality
tranches of the underlying MBSs – i.e., the portions of the MBS that were
least likely to be repaid – the entire CDO entailed substantial default risk.
Through creative packaging and machinations, however, participants in the
mortgage industry that created and sold these financial products were able
to obtain high ratings (e.g., AAA) for many CDO tranches, thereby hiding
this default risk from investors and maximizing the profits flowing to the
securitizing entities.50
——————————————————————————————
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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Finally, these same institutions and market participants also found
a way to maximize their profits and hide the risk of even the lowest
tranches of the CDO – i.e., the most at risk portion of a collection of the
riskiest residential mortgages – by yet again repackaging these low-quality
CDO tranches into another bundled product, the “CDO-squared,” which
would again be sold to outside investors at a profit.51
The final product of this financial manipulation of residential
mortgages, the typical practice throughout the relevant period, can be
graphically displayed as follows:

——————————————————————————————
51
See Raghuram Rajan, A View of the Liquidity Crisis, CHICAGO
BOOTH (Feb.2008), https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/raghuram.rajan/reseac
h/papers/A%20view%20of%20the%20liquidity%20crisis.pdf.
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As the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and
Economic Crisis in the United States concluded in The Financial Crisis
Inquiry Report, “[s]ecuritization was designed to benefit lenders,
investment bankers, and investors. Lenders earned fees for originating and
selling loans. Investment banks earned fees for issuing mortgage-backed
securities.... Purchasers of the safer tranches got a higher rate of return than
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ultra-safe Treasury notes without much extra risk – at least in theory.”52
That last caveat proved to be exceptionally significant, because while
lenders and investment bankers in the mortgage industry indeed profited
from the resulting explosion in mortgage-backed securitization, these
profits came at the direct expense of investors and resulted directly from
the deliberate misconduct of these entities.
IV.

THE DOMINANCE OF SECURITIZATION

Starting in 2000 (and in occasional years before then), a growing
majority of residential mortgages originated in the United States were
securitized, and the rate of securitization during this period increased
virtually every year.53 By the late 2000s, the vast majority of residential
mortgages were securitized rather than held by the originating lender, and
this rate was exacerbated for originators whose business model relied upon
securitization.54 Securitization was exceptionally dominant in the
“subprime” portion of the mortgage industry, the particular portion of the
industry most relevant to the mortgages at issue in the majority of criminal
and civil prosecutions. Securitization levels peaked at roughly ninety
percent of originated mortgages before the housing (and securitization)
market crashed in 2008 and 2009.55
Further, during this period virtually every mortgage originator in
the United States designated Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
Inc. (“MERS”) as the beneficial nominee on its mortgages in order to
facilitate the easy transfer and securitization of the resulting mortgages,
without the requirement that these transfers be recorded or publicly
available.56 Typically, mortgages in this industry were securitized almost
——————————————————————————————
52
THE CDO MACHINE, supra note 39.
53
See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16 at 20.
54
See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE
J. ON REG. 1, 11–13 (2011).
55
See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16 at 20.
56
See Ellen Brown, Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Million Homes
be Foreclosure-Proof?, YES! MAG., (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.yesmagaz
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immediately after origination. The lenders were eager to obtain their profits
from the brokers who bundled and securitized these mortgages, while the
brokers were desperate for additional mortgages to bundle, and investors
were hungry to purchase new securitized packages.57
As a result of these innovations, the extent of securitization was
massive. For example, in 2006 alone, over $1.15 trillion in mortgagebacked securities were issued.58 Moreover, the majority (seventy-one
percent) of the assets in these MBS products consisted of subprime or AltA (“liar loan”) mortgages.59 Subprime and liar loan mortgages were; (a)
typically made to lower-quality borrowers; (b) often made through “lite
doc,” “stated income,” and/or stated (or no) asset mortgage programs; and,
(c) generally made at higher interest rates. This portion of the mortgage
industry consisted of the riskiest – yet most profitable – loans.60
Furthermore, those loans were almost invariably securitized, and because
they offered the highest interest rates (and yet could be bundled or tranched
with AAA ratings), were the ones most sought after by both lenders and
other participants in the mortgage industry (e.g., brokers and investors).61
ine.org/new-economy/homeowners-rebellion-could-62-million-homes-beforeclosure-proof.
57
See generally Miguel Segoviano Basurto, Bradley Jones, Peter Lindner
& Johannes Blankenheim, Securitization: Lessons Learned and the Road
Ahead 38 (Int’l. Monetary Fund Working Paper No. 13/255, Nov. 2013), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2381853 (choose to either download
the paper or open pdf in browser).
58
See THE CDO MACHINE, supra note 39, at 102.
59
Id.
60
See generally Bill Black, Only Lying Lenders Made “Liar’s”
Loans, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.businessinside
r.com/only-lying-lenders-made-liars-loans-2011-3.
61
See Michael LaCour-Little & Jing Yang, Taking the Lie Out of Liar Loans:
The Effect of Reduced Documentation on the Performance and Pricing of Alt-A and
Subprime Mortgages, 35 J. REAL EST. RES. 507, 508 (2013); Richard Greenberg &
Chris Hansen, ‘If you had a pulse, we gave you a loan’, DATELINE NBC (Mar. 22,
2009, 7:32:49 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29827248/ns/dateline_nbcthe_hansen_files_with_chris_hansen/t/if-you-had-pulse-we-gave-you-loan/#.WaNO
atMrK34.
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MORTGAGE FRAUD AND THE MARKET

Lenders of these types of loans during the relevant period did not
generally make mortgages with any hope or expectation that the bank
would make money when, or if these loans were repaid.62 These entities
instead originated these loans exclusively in the expectation that they
would immediately bundle and sell them to outside investors, keeping fees
and making profits for the banks regardless of whether the loans were
actually repaid. This was the routine and nearly uniform practice in the
mortgage origination industry during the relevant period. Because lenders
promptly bundled and sold these mortgages, in pieces, they did not face
any risk of loss and instead obtained substantial profits even when loans
were entirely unpaid and foreclosed on. This persisted even when real
estate prices declined.63
This was true even with respect to mortgages obtained through
fraudulent means. Throughout the 2000s, mortgage fraud was rampant
across the United States.64 The details of any particular fraud scheme
varied. Generally speaking, individuals would buy (or assist others in
buying) residential properties by making false statements about their
income, assets, intentions for the property, sale prices, or other facts in
connection with the transactions.65 These individuals would then retain
proceeds from the resulting residential mortgages.66 After the subsequent
burst of the housing bubble, the properties would often go into foreclosure,
——————————————————————————————
62
See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16, at 18.
63
Id.
64
L. Randall Wray, The Mortgage Fraud Scandal Is the Biggest in
Human History, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 14, 2010, 9:30 PM), http://www.busin
essinsider.com/mortgage-fraud-scandal-2010-10).
65
See Nicole Stowell, Carl Pacini, Martina Schmidt & Kathryn
Keller, Mortgage Fraud: Schemes, Red Flags, and Responses, 6 J. OF
FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT. 225, 229 (2014), http://web.nacva.com
/JFIA/Issues/JFIA-2014-2_7.pdf.
66
Id.
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in which case the lenders would repossess and then sell the mortgaged
properties, often at a substantial loss.67
When a direct lender originates and holds a mortgage, it is the
originating bank that stands to make money if the mortgage is fully repaid,
or, lose money if it is not. By contrast, once a loan is securitized, the
allocation of benefits and losses dramatically changes. Banks that originate
and then securitize their loans make money merely by originating the loan,
and do not stand to gain or lose money based on whether the mortgage is
repaid. Instead, banks profit by collecting mortgage origination and other
fees (including “junk” fees) associated with the mortgage, as well as
additional proceeds based upon the “spread” between the stated interest
rate on the mortgage and prevailing market interest rates.68 In other words,
once the bank securitizes the loan, it no longer cares whether it is repaid.
Instead, its only concern is that the loans are generated, since the bank
made its money through loan origination rather than repayment.69
The economic realities engendered by securitization were reflected
in the loan products offered to borrowers by the banks. As the insatiable
demand for securitized mortgages continued to grow, banks developed and
originated high-interest “stated income/stated asset” mortgages that
required no documentation and relied upon the borrower’s own (almost
invariably misstated) representations about his income and assets to
underwrite the loan. From 2000 to 2007, low-and-no-documentation
mortgages more than quadrupled, from less than two percent to roughly
nine percent of all outstanding loans. Similarly, alt-A originations increased
from less than $20 billion in 2000 to more than $300 billion in 2005.

——————————————————————————————
67
Id.
68
See Peter Eavis, With Rates Low, Banks Increase Mortgage
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2012, at A5. Spread fees are profits paid to the
mortgage originator when the interest rate on a mortgage is higher than
market rates; e.g., when the interest rate on a loan is eight percent but the
typical interest rate is only six percent. Id.
69
See Fligstein & Roehrkasse, supra note 16.
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Eighty percent of all subprime mortgages that were securitized in 2006 had
limited or no documentation.70
The inherent risk of these loans did not deter the banks from
making them. As the National Commission explained, with securitization,
“[t]he mortgages would be packaged, sliced, repackaged, insured, and sold
as incomprehensibly complicated debt securities to an assortment of hungry
investors. Now even the worst loans could find a buyer. More loan sales
meant higher profits for everyone in the chain.”71
Those buyers were, in turn, as desperate to buy mortgage-backed
securities as the mortgage industry was to package and sell them. An MBS
with a AAA rating would facially deliver high interest rates and was
backed by a concrete asset – a residential property, typically in a rapidlyappreciating market. Additionally, particular tranches of an MBS would
often facially promise exceptionally high returns. Investors knew little
about the underlying risks of these securities, but they knew how much
they paid, and how hot the underlying real estate market was. That was all
that mattered. As long as the housing market continued to appreciate,
everyone would make money.
VI.

THE PROFITS
MORTGAGES

AND

LOSSES

OF

FRAUDULENT

But, of course, all good things invariably come to an end. The
housing bubble eventually collapsed. Borrowers stopped making their
mortgage payments, and individuals and entities that held residential
mortgages were often forced to foreclose on the property. When properties
were eventually foreclosed upon, the sales price of the property was often a
small fraction of the amount of the mortgage. Losses were huge. But not
for the bank.
The bank that originated and funded the loan rarely held the
foreclosed-upon mortgage. Rather, that mortgage had typically long ago
been bundled and sold to outside investors. The originating lender rarely
——————————————————————————————
70
See THE CDO MACHINE, supra note 39.
71
Id. at 7.
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lost money from even the most blatant mortgage fraud scheme. Instead,
those mortgages generated hefty fees for the originating lender, and the fact
that those loans later failed did not affect the lender, who had long ago
departed the scene.
As a result of routine securitization, these entities benefitted, rather
than lost money, as a result of the pervasive securitization and the
fraudulent mortgages with which they were associated. They sold these
mortgages to others for a profit. They made money from origination and
underwriting fees. They did not bear the risk of default, which they instead
transferred to others through the securitization of these loans.
When the banks securitized the underlying mortgages, they were
bundled with a plethora of other mortgages and sold, in pieces, to others.
The beneficial owners of these pieces were the ones who bore the risk of
the resulting default upon the fraudulent mortgages, not the originating and
investment banks. Moreover, when borrowers defaulted on these
mortgages, typically, no particular person or entity – and, in any event
certainly not the originating bank – owned the entirety of a single one of
these loans. Rather, as the National Commission explained in its Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report, by the time a single mortgage was foreclosed, “a
mortgage on a home in south Florida might become parts of dozens of
securities owned by hundreds of investors – or parts of bets being made by
hundreds more.”72
Thus, the beneficial owners of the mortgage-backed securities
within which the underlying mortgages were bundled were the only ones
who could gain or lose money as a result of the repayment or failure to
repay the loan. Despite this, courts in mortgage fraud cases have almost
uniformly entered criminal restitution orders that ignore this basic fact.
Instead, these orders portray the originating banks as the entities that have
shouldered the financial consequences of the fraud. As a result, such orders
require individuals found guilty of mortgage fraud to pay those banks all
losses from the underlying loans; typically, millions of dollars.73
——————————————————————————————
72
Id. at 8.
73
See, e.g., Robers v. U.S., 134 S. Ct. 1854, 1856-59 (2014) (affirming
$220,000 restitution order); U.S. v. Beecroft, 825 F.3d 991, 995-97 (9th Cir.
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As has been stressed, the banks were not the ones who lost money.
Rather, the ones who lost were the beneficial owners, typically consisting
of mutual funds that had purchased an MBS, CDO, or MBS/CDO tranche,
pension funds that had made a similar investment, hedge funds,
governmental entities (e.g., municipalities), and on the rare occasion high
net worth individuals looking for increased yields. Moreover, not only did
these individuals and entities not own a particular mortgage or even a
particular piece of any mortgage; they almost always only owned a
specified piece of a bundle of loans; i.e., the tranche associated with their
purchase. Finally, even the entities that formally owned a particular tranche
of a given MBS containing a fraudulent mortgage were still generally not
the ones who gained or lost money from a default. Rather, it was the
beneficial owners of those overlying securities – e.g., the individuals who
owned shares in the mutual fund – who were the ones who actually stood to
gain or lose from the return generated by the piece of an MBS or CDO
tranche owned by the distributing entity.
For an allegedly fraudulent mortgage, then, the people who were
actually at risk for losing money as a result of any subsequent default
typically numbered in the tens or hundreds of thousands, or even millions.
For example, a given mortgage might be securitized by a lender, bundled
and sold in various MBS tranches, and a tiny slice of one of those particular
tranches then purchased by a particular mutual fund (e.g., Vanguard),
which then sells to investors a mutual fund of which this tiny slice of an
MBS tranche is in turn a tiny portion of the fund. As a result, every
individual investor who owned that particular Vanguard fund would be
someone who might have lost money as a result of the default on the
underlying mortgage.
2016) (affirming $2.2 million restitution order); U.S. v. Cross, 273 F.App’x. 557
(7th Cir. 2008) (affirming $4.3 million restitution order); U.S. v. Powell,
509 F.App’x. 958 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming $843,000 restitution order). Courts
do not appear to have considered the dominant presence of securitization in
assessing the propriety of these restitution orders, nor does there appear to have
been any evidence submitted in the underlying restitution hearings regarding this
market practice.

2018

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE MORTGAGE CRISIS

265

But even these individuals were likely not materially harmed by
any particular mortgage fraud (or series of fraud). Rather, to determine
whether any person suffered any identifiable injury, one would first have to
ascertain whether the level of defaults of other (totally unrelated)
mortgages in the particular MBS rose to the level of the particular tranche
of the MBS purchased by the mutual fund (or other entity). If not, then the
investor in that fund would not lose even a penny notwithstanding his or
her beneficial ownership of a piece of the defaulted mortgage. And even if
one could conclude that a particular tranche was, in fact, affected, one
would then have to assess whether this tranche was insured, either by the
government or private entities, as many MBS tranches were; if so, the
mutual fund investor would again lose no money as a result of the default.
Finally, even if one could identify with certainty that an individual
beneficial investor owned some tiny portion of a mutual fund that in turn
owned a tiny piece of an uninsured tranche of an MBS containing a
particular fraudulent loan, and one was then somehow able to calculate
with precision the degree of this individual investor’s exposure to any
particular fraudulent mortgage, in truth, such an investor would not, in fact,
have lost even a penny as a result the default. Any individual’s alleged
“loss” from any such default would instead be, quite literally, a rounding
error, and would not in fact affect at all the investor’s actual return. Even
in the worst of all possible worlds, an investor who has purchased, say,
$100,000 worth of mutual fund shares in the $200 billion Vanguard 500
fund, which in turn invested a fraction of its assets in a tiny piece of a
particular billion-dollar MBS, which in turn experienced even a milliondollar default in one of those mortgages, would find that the net asset value
of that fund would change not even a penny – or even a fraction of a
fraction of a penny – as a result of this default. It would not matter. Even
the $100,000 investor would not fear, nor would any such investor in fact
typically incur, the loss of even a penny as a result of the default of a
particular fraudulently obtained mortgage, even if there was a default on
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that mortgage and the underlying property sold for a mere fraction of that
mortgage.74
But it gets worse. Even if these beneficial owners had incurred
actual losses as a result of the default of a particular fraudulent mortgage,
the restitution orders typically entered by courts do absolutely nothing to
remedy these losses. These restitution orders do not compel the individual
convicted of fraud to identify and reimburse the investors who actually
(allegedly) incurred a loss from the underlying mortgage. Instead, these
orders compel the defendant to pay these losses to the originating banks.
To reiterate: the banks made, rather than lost, money on these
securitized mortgages. Providing money to these banks in restitution in no
way remediates the harm to any beneficial owners of the fraudulent
mortgages allegedly injured by the defaults. The originating lenders have
no continuing relationship with the investors who (hypothetically) would
——————————————————————————————
74
There are additional reasons not to worry about potential restitution
to particular MBS investors as well. When individuals or entities
purchased an MBS or CDO, these actors were neither participating as
direct lenders nor funding an individual mortgage. Instead, by purchasing a
selected “tranche” of a huge bundle of mortgages, rather than funding
a particular loan, they were essentially placing a bet on the overall real
estate market. Investors in an MBS tranche invariably thought that real
estate prices would continue to rise, and hence that their tranche would be
repaid either as borrowers refinanced or (if necessary) when the bank
repossessed and sold the appreciated residence. These investors were not
betting on an individual loan or mortgage. They were instead betting on the
overall market. If the overall market went up, their bundle would go up,
and they would make money. If the overall market went down, their bundle
would go down, and they would lose money.
This is, in fact, why investors purchased residential-backed mortgage
securities. Investors who thought that the real estate market was a bubble
did not buy them. Those who thought that real estate would continue to
appreciate did. Whether an individual mortgage was unsound, or unwise, or
even fraudulent, was not the bet they made, and would not materially affect
the value of their security. What mattered was simply the overall direction
of the underlying real estate market.

2018

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE MORTGAGE CRISIS

267

have been the ones financially harmed by the defaulted mortgages. Any
restitution paid to these banks simply constitutes a windfall to them.
These restitution payments do not go to anyone who actually
incurred any losses (even if they could be identified) as a result of the
underlying fraudulent loans. Rather, these restitution payments simply
become the assets of the relevant bank – a bank that, unlike the investor,
actually gained, rather than lost, money as a result of the fraud.
The prevailing judicial restitution orders thus essentially rob Peter
(the defendant) to pay Paul (the originating banks). And this robbery
typically occurs when Peter’s already in prison, and Paul not only didn’t
lose any money, but actually made money from – and often participated in
– the underlying fraud. When the underlying mortgage has been
securitized, the typical restitution order entered in favor of the originating
bank is not only improper, but inequitable.
It is certainly true that lenders and others suffered mightily as a
result of the collapse of the housing market and the burst of the real estate
bubble. Banks failed, lenders went out of business, and billions of dollars in
real estate valuations disappeared in the historical blink of an eye.
Moreover, it is also true that some small fraction of those losses were
infected with fraud, and resulted from mortgage loans made to individuals
who were neither forthright nor fully truthful in their underlying mortgage
applications.
But these businesses failed because the market collapsed, not
because they lost money on the underlying loans. When the housing market
crashed, investors were no longer confident in future real estate
appreciation, and without such anticipated appreciation, no longer wanted
to buy mortgage-backed securities. That is what destroyed the banks and
lenders, not losses from any underlying frauds. Without demand from
investors, there was no demand for securitization, and without
securitization, lenders could not originate loans. The market dried up, and
those lenders who participated in that market went bankrupt or disappeared.
That was not the fault of any individual who engaged in mortgage
fraud. It was the result of the crash of the overall housing market, for
reasons having nothing to do with fraud and everything to do with the
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irrational exuberance of both purchasers of and investors in real estate.
Lenders surely lost money, but, with the exception of the minority of direct
make-and-hold originators, not from fraud.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The dominant presence of mortgage securitization during the
relevant period critically affects the propriety of civil and criminal
restitution orders. Courts continue to enter such orders based upon a
simplistic and outdated understanding of mortgage lending that does not
reflect the dominant market in this century. The restitution orders entered
by courts almost invariably fail to direct restitution payments to the actual
losers, and instead improperly award restitution to lenders who made –
rather than lost – money from the underlying fraud.
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